This edge indicates that the principal can reset the password of the target user without knowing the current password of that user.
To see an example of this edge being abused, see this clip from Derbycon 2017:
There are at least two ways to execute this attack. The first and most obvious is by using the built-in net.exe binary in Windows (e.g.: net user dfm.a Password123! /domain). See the opsec considerations section for why this may be a bad idea. The second, and highly recommended method, is by using the Set-DomainUserPassword function in PowerView. This function is superior to using the net.exe binary in several ways. For instance, you can supply alternate credentials, instead of needing to run a process as or logon as the user with the ForceChangePassword privilege. Additionally, you have much safer execution options than you do with spawning net.exe (see the opsec info below).
To abuse this privilege with PowerView’s Set-DomainUserPassword, first import PowerView into your agent session or into a PowerShell instance at the console. You may need to authenticate to the Domain Controller as the user with the password reset privilege if you are not running a process as that user.
To do this in conjunction with Set-DomainUserPassword, first create a PSCredential object (these examples comes from the PowerView help documentation):
$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('CONTOSO\\dfm.a', $SecPassword)
Then create a secure string object for the password you want to set on the target user:
$UserPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
Finally, use Set-DomainUserPassword, optionally specifying $Cred if you are not already running within a process as the user with the password reset privilege
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity andy -AccountPassword $UserPassword -Credential $Cred
Now that you know the target user’s plain text password, you can either start a new agent as that user, or use that user’s credentials in conjunction with PowerView’s ACL abuse functions, or perhaps even RDP to a system the target user has access to. For more ideas and information, see the references section below.
Executing this abuse with the net binary will necessarily require command line execution. If your target organization has command line logging enabled, this is a detection opportunity for their analysts.
Regardless of what execution procedure you use, this action will generate a 4724 event on the domain controller that handled the request. This event may be centrally collected and analyzed by security analysts, especially for users that are obviously very high privilege groups (i.e.: Domain Admin users). Also be mindful that PowerShell v5 introduced several key security features such as script block logging and AMSI that provide security analysts another detection opportunity. You may be able to completely evade those features by downgrading to PowerShell v2.
Finally, by changing a service account password, you may cause that service to stop functioning properly. This can be bad not only from an opsec perspective, but also a client management perspective. Be careful!